The migration of Ukrainians in times of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY Number 187, 2015-10-19

Before the Russian annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the scale of labour outward migration of Ukrainians had been characterised by a slight downward trend. Back in 2014, an increase in the number of Ukrainians who migrated to Russia was observed, although no similar increase was recorded for EU countries (excluding Poland). The year 2015 brought a more rapid surge in the number of Ukrainians migrating to the EU, again mainly to Poland. Due to the lack of current EU-wide data, estimates can be made based only on data compiled by national statistical offices in countries which are the most popular with Ukrainian migrants. In Poland, as of October 2015 Ukrainians held 52,000 valid residence cards. Much greater migration dynamics have been observed in the case of temporary migration – the number of declarations which enable an individual to take up a temporary job in Poland, issued in the first half of 2015, was a staggering 400,000. This means a more than twofold increase – in the whole of 2014 372,000 declarations were issued to Ukrainian citizens. No similar increase has so far been observed in other EU states, including Italy and the Czech Republic, which have always been popular destinations for Ukrainian migration. In late 2014, 233,000 Ukrainian migrants were registered in Italy (in late 2013 the figure was 191,000), whereas in the Czech Republic the number of Ukrainian migrants remains stable – 104,000 in June 2015

The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: an assessment of Ukraine's readiness. OSW Commentary No. 45, 2011-01-17

The Action Plan on visas adopted during the recent EU-Ukraine summit is a success for Ukraine. It is the first time that Kyiv has succeeded in obtaining a definition of the conditions and criteria whose fulfilment will enable Ukraine to apply for the lifting of EU visas for its citizens. Ukraine's strong point has been its political will; the lifting of this visa regime has been a priority for all Ukrainian governments since 2005. Since Viktor Yanukovych became president, Ukraine has adopted or prepared key legal acts that brought it nearer to European standards in the area of border and migration management. One of Kyiv's strengths is also its relatively well reformed and efficiently managed border service. Moreover, illegal transit migration via Ukraine is decreasing, and fewer Ukrainians are trying to enter or stay in the EU illegally. Also, Kyiv has efficiently implemented the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement. The hardest task for Ukraine will be to meet the EU’s expectations concerning values, the condition of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule of law. Corruption remains the main barrier to Ukraine's development and modernisation; the courts are weak and the judicial system inefficient. The main undertaking of the new migration service that is being formed at the moment will be to create a civil system of registration, monitoring and regulating the stays of foreign nationals. This may prove difficult, as the supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an unreformed, police-type bureaucratic institution. Ukraine is lagging behind countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova when it comes to the introduction of biometric documents. Another problem is the lack of an electronic information system on foreign nationals, visas and border crossings which would be accessible to all the relevant services and institutions. For these reasons, the complete abolition of visas seems to be a longterm perspective, especially considering that many EU countries, which themselves are faced with the problem of migrants’ integration, are rather sceptical about the further liberalisation of movement of people with their eastern neighbours. In the immediate future, if Ukraine meets some of the requirements set by the EU, it will be able to seek the extension of the visa facilitations that have been in operation since 2008

Migration from Ukraine to Poland. The trend stabilises. OSW Report October 2018

The increased wave of migration from Ukraine to Poland which began in 2014 is slowly beginning to decelerate. This migration is still mainly temporary in nature, and it is difficult to assess to what extent it may become fully residential. Probably over the passage of time, the current circular migration model will stop attracting new people. However, Poland remains the main EU country in which Ukrainians work, because of several competitive advantages: extensive migration networks, a liberal procedure for legalising residence and work (for short periods). In addition, despite the fact that the salaries migrants earn in Poland are small compared to countries in the west of the EU, the low living costs allow for regular and relatively high remittances to Ukraine. Poland’s neighbouring countries have started to open up their labour markets to citizens of Ukraine to a limited degree; for example, the Czech Republic has increased its quotas for labour migrants, and Hungary has introduced an easier procedure for acquiring citizenship. Only in Germany do Ukrainians remain marginal among groups of foreign workers. No further rapid increase in migration from Ukraine is possible, due to the country’s dramatic demographic situation, the problems on local labour markets in western Ukraine, and the falling numbers of people of working age

Combating corruption in Ukraine – awaiting the results. OSW Commentary NUMBER 244 | 12.07.2017

Systemic corruption has been the dominant problem of an independent Ukraine for more than two decades. The takeover of the state by a political-business group led by Viktor Yanukovych had been one of the principal causes for large-scale street protests during the Revolution of Dignity. Following the 2014 power shift, slogans calling for combating corruption and cleaning up the elites have featured among the most important priorities announced by President Petro Poroshenko and two consecutive prime ministers – Arseniy Yatsenyuk and Volodymyr Groysman. Moreover, the fight against corruption remains the West’s main condition to support Ukraine

Combating corruption in Ukraine – the beginning of a long march. OSW COMMENTARY Number 170, 06.05.2015

From a public opinion point of view, corruption has been the gravest problem of today’s Ukraine, excepting the armed conflict in the east of the country. The government might be able to delay certain key reforms such as the constitutional reform or the reform of local government structures, however, without stepping up measures to combat corruption they would face the risk of losing social support which has already been weak. There is no single strategy for combating corruption in Ukraine. What has been implemented is a series of often contradictory concepts and actions (initiated by the president’s office, the government, civil society institutions, or launched to meet the requirements of donors). The successes of the new government have included efforts aimed at fighting corruption at the middle level of government and the introduction of legislative changes in compliance with international practice. The main weaknesses, on the other hand, have been the lack of efficient mechanisms to implement the adopted legislation to ensure that an individual charged with corruption (regardless of political connections) could be effectively tried and the money received as bribery could be returned to the state. Similarly, the judiciary system has not been prepared to actively handle corruption cases

Opening in times of crisis? Examining NATO and the EU's support to security sector reform in post-Maidan Ukraine

Security sector reform has remained largely disconnected from the broader debate on societal transition in the literature thus far. We conceptualise how external support to security sector reform could potentially facilitate socio-political order opening in a limited access order. Based on two dimensions, we examine the case of NATO and EU's support to Ukraine's security sector reform between 2014 and 2019. NATO's support to the military and the EU's support to the police and state security service (SBU) appear unlikely to cause opening of the social order, while NATO's support to the military-industrial complex is more likely to cause opening

Ukrainians' EU migration prospects. OSW Commentary No. 128, 10.03.2014.

The political crisis in Ukraine, particularly the bloodshed seen on 18–20 February and the subsequent Russian intervention in Crimea, has sparked fears of another possible wave of immigrants heading to the EU. However, the country was partially politically stabilised (at least in its central and western parts), and this has made the scenario of a mass migration of people from Ukraine rather unlikely. If there is no civil war in Ukraine, any further development of the political situation in Ukraine may have only an indirect impact on the actual migration. Should the political instability continue, the Ukrainian economy remain in recession while jobs are available for Ukrainian immigrants in the EU, then an increase in the migration of Ukrainian citizens to the EU, including Poland, would be possible. In the short term there may be two characteristic groups of immigrants: (1) young people who will attempt to leave Ukraine for good due to the lack of job opportunities; (2) circulating migrants, mainly from western Ukraine, who will be looking for temporary jobs. Only if the economic downturn trend and political turmoil in Ukraine continues for a longer time, will settlement migration increase

Making the impossible possible: the prospects for visa-free movement between the EU and its eastern partners. OSW Point of View Number 27, May 2012

To make the abolition of visas in relations between the EU and the Eastern European countries possible, the ”spell cast” must be broken on this issue. With the present levels of mobility and people-to-people, business and political contacts the introduction of a visa-free regime will be a natural consequence of the liberalisation processes which have been at work for years.Moreover, the decision to lift the visa requirement is unlikely to significantly stimulate an increase in migration pressure from Eastern European countries but could reduce the operating costs of expanded Schengen consular network. Lifting the visa requirement for Eastern European citizens can be temporary and conditional and allow for actual implementation of an increased conditionality rule. In political terms, making visa liberalisation a key issue would fundamentally change the partners’ approach to the Eastern Partnership and would provide a link to the Partnership for Modernisation targeted at Russia

Polen als Land der politischen Immigration aus Belarus: zwischen schwieriger Geschichte, technokratischer Einstellung und großer Politik

Seit vielen Jahren ist Polen ein wichtiger Aufenthalts- und Aktionsort für Teile der politischen und kulturellen Elite Belarus’, in geringerem Maße auch der politischen Diaspora anderer Staaten der ehemaligen UdSSR. Man kann allerdings nicht sagen, dass Polen als klassisches Aufnahmeland für politische Flüchtlinge mit einer gut entwickelten Tradition zur Unterstützung ihrer Aktivitäten gilt. Zu den Gründen gehören das komplizierte historische Erbe, Sorge um die Situation der Polen im Herkunftsland der betreffenden Migranten sowie auch die diffuse und gleichzeitig technokratische Einstellung gegenüber Fragen der Einwanderung. Auch wenn einige Unterstützungsprogramme für die politische Emigration aus Belarus, z. B. für Studierende und Medienangehörige, schon seit Jahren existieren, bleibt festzuhalten, dass sich eine ganzheitliche institutionelle Herangehensweise (inklusive aktiver Beteiligung belarussischer Organisationen in Polen und Initiativen von polnischen Bürgern) erst nach den massenhaften Repressionen in Belarus im August 2020 entwickelt hat